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The Chaebols in South Korea:  Spearheading Economic Growth 
Fast Facts 
 Chaebols are large multinational family-controlled 
conglomerates in South Korea, which have enjoyed strong 
governmental support. 
 
 The word Chaebol literally means “business association”.  
 
 President Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) widely propagated 
and publicized the chaebol model of state-corporate 
alliance. 
 
 The Chaebols have invested heavily in the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. 
 
 Some well-recognized South Korean conglomerates 
boasting global brand names are Samsung, Hyundai and 
LG. 
 
 The chaebol model of state-corporate alliance is based on 
the Japanese Zaibatsu system, which encouraged economic 
development through large business conglomerates from 
1968 until the end of the World War II. 
 
 
 
 
South Korea has witnessed an 
incredible transformation in the 
three decades spanning from the 
1960s to 1990s, evolving from an 
impoverished country to a 
developed high-income economy 
today. Often referred to as the 
“Miracle of the Han River”, this 
remarkable turnaround was 
achieved through an aggressive, 
outward-oriented strategy, 
focusing on developing large-scale 
industrial conglomerates or 
chaebols.  
Today, the chaebols have become 
multinational powerhouses with a 
global footprint. And with this, 
South Korea boasts of an economy 
that ranks 15th globally in nominal 
terms and 13th in terms of 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
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Source: ‘Chaebol Powered Industrial Transformation’ by Ahn 
Choong-yong, Korea Institute of Public Administration and Korea 
Times, April 2010. 
Paradigm shift in the South Korean economy 
The first half of the 20th century was a tumultuous, war-ravaged period for the country, 
punctuated by a 35-year Japanese colonization of the country, which ended with Japan’s defeat 
in World War II.  Following, the three-year Korean War between North and South Korea ended 
with United Nations (UN) intervention that brokered peace in 1953. Understandably, this left 
South Korea with a poverty-stricken economy. But the 18-year reign of President Park Chung 
Hee (1961-79) was instrumental in ushering in an era of unprecedented development. He led a 
landmark transformation of the economy from a predominantly agrarian to an industrialized 
economy.  
Emphasizing an export-led, outward-oriented model, the government wholeheartedly encouraged 
the growth of large conglomerates or the chaebols, developing a close and collusive relationship 
with them. These economic policies resulted in fast-paced economic growth, with GDP 
averaging 10% annual growth between 1962 and 1994. While the contribution of agriculture to 
the economy declined from 37% in 1965 to 3% in 2008, the industrial sector increased its 
contribution from 20% to 37%, and that of services from 43% to 60%. Of course, exports 
remained the cornerstone of this economic development, with their share in GDP accelerating 
from 8% in 1965 to a whopping 53% in 2008. 
 
Powering chaebols to fuel explosive economic growth 
In the process of industrializing the 
economy, the South Korean 
government encouraged their domestic 
business groups in a big way. Most of 
the South Korean big businesses 
assumed a chaebol form, characterized 
by: 
 A closed and concentrated, 
most often family-centered 
ownership structure. 
 A highly diversified business 
structure. 
 
By 1962, all commercial banks were nationalized, channeling financial resources to the chaebols 
under the directive of the government. The share of these conglomerates in total credit advanced 
by financial institutions was over 60% during the period from 1960-1991 (‘The Post-Crisis Changes 
in the Financial System in Korea: Problems of Neoliberal Restructuring and Financial Opening after 1997’, Kang-
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Kook Lee, TWN Global Economy Series, 2010). In return, these conglomerates were required to fulfill 
ambitious export obligations, which fueled rapid economic growth for these 30 years.  
To stoke economic development, the government followed a two-pronged strategy of export 
promotion coupled with import substitution. The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
restricted, but judiciously used as a means to harvest new technologies and managerial expertise. 
Conglomerates were liberally permitted to access foreign loans, promoted by the government to 
support fast-paced economic development, while in contrast outflows of domestic capital were 
effectively curbed (‘The Post-Crisis Changes in the Financial System in Korea: Problems of Neoliberal 
Restructuring and Financial Opening after 1997’, Kang-Kook Lee, TWN Global Economy Series, 2010).  
As a result of the South Korean government’s unbridled and all-encompassing support, the 
chaebols experienced unprecedented expansion in size and scope. With the government virtually 
ensuring against their bankruptcy, the chaebols began to be perceived as ‘too big to fail’. Their 
overbearing supremacy in the Korean economy was evident in their expanding presence in the 
economy. The top 30 chaebols’ contribution to the country’s GDP swelled from 9.8% in 1973 to 
29.6% by 1989. Further, by 1997, the 30 largest chaebols accounted for virtually half of the total 
assets, debts, sales and net profits of the corporate sector in the economy (Corporate Governance and 
Finance in East Asia, Vol. II, Asian Development Bank, 2001). 
Business Areas of Top Five Chaebols 
Industry Hyundai Samsung LG Daewoo SK 
Automobile * *  *  
Aerospace * *  *  
Construction * * * * * 
Consumer Electronics  * * *  
Financial Services * *  *  
Machinery * * * *  
Oil Refinery *  *  * 
Petrochemical * * *  * 
Semiconductor * * *   
Shipbuilding * *  *  
Telecom Equipment * * * *  
Telecom Service    * * 
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The 1997 financial crisis jolts the chaebol-driven economy 
In the prelude to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the South Korean economy was perceived as 
remarkably sound compared to its other East Asian counterparts. During 1990-1995, while 
average economic growth was about 7%-8%, inflation remained below 5% and unemployment 
was stable at around 3%. The South Korean economy was fiscally comfortable, while its current 
account deficit, which peaked in 1996, was still below 5% of GDP, lower than most other East 
Asian economies. 
However, trouble was brewing in South Korea’s financial sector, threatening its macroeconomic 
fundamentals. While until the early 1990s the financial sector remained regulated under 
government control, the early 1990s witnessed extensive domestic financial as well as capital 
market liberalization. This was a prerequisite for the country’s Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) membership, which it later gained in 1996. This policy 
encouraged a rapid mushrooming of financial institutions, which increasingly engaged in 
mobilizing foreign-currency denominated loans for the chaebol-dominated corporate sector. 
While financial sector liberalization pushed up low interest rates, the government still ensured an 
easy availability of credit to the chaebols. 
The fundamental flaw was that South Korea chose to liberalize its short-term capital flows ahead 
of its long-term flows. A large proportion of this short-term external debt was channeled to the 
expanding chaebols, which were increasingly relying on debt-financed rather than equity-
financed growth. Backed by government guarantee and the overarching emphasis on size rather 
than profitability, the chaebols were straddled with perilous debt-equity ratios and dangerously 
high financial leverage. By the end of 1997, the average debt-equity ratio for the top 30 chaebols 
skyrocketed above 500%. While the economy’s proportion of short-term external debt to total 
external debt had soared to 60% by 1996, the dependence of the chaebols on external financing 
as a proportion of their total financing had zoomed to 77.6% in 1996 (‘The Post-Crisis Changes in the 
Financial System in Korea: Problems of Neoliberal Restructuring and Financial Opening after 1997’, Kang-Kook 
Lee, TWN Global Economy Series, 2010). Moreover, the massive capital inflows also led to an 
exchange rate appreciation, worsening the competitive position of the export-driven chaebols. 
As the corporate sector became progressively highly leveraged, the financial sector in turn 
became extremely vulnerable, plagued with burgeoning non-performing assets. The highly 
leveraged position of most chaebols coupled with their loss in competitiveness, triggered a string 
of bankruptcies, beginning in 1997. Between 1997 and 1999, at least 11 chaebols out of the 
largest 30 went bankrupt. One of the most prominent bankruptcies at that time was that of 
Daewoo, which prior to the financial crisis of 1997 was the second largest chaebol. While at the 
time of the crisis the other chaebols cut back on debt and underwent restructuring, Daewoo took 
on additional debt while adding new firms, despite huge losses. After its bankruptcy in 1999, the 
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group was spun-off into three distinct entities- Daewoo Corporation (now Daewoo Electronics), 
Daewoo Engineering and Construction and Daewoo International Corporation. 
 
The IMF bailout and the reform era 
The chaebol bankruptcies and the exposed vulnerabilities in the South Korean financial sector 
severely hampered investor confidence, sparking off massive capital outflows from the economy. 
As a result, the South Korean currency, the won, experienced a free fall, depreciating more than 
50% against the dollar between November and December 1997. This had disastrous implications 
for the corporate as well as the financial sectors. With their external debt burden worsening, they 
were thrown into a crisis situation. As a last resort, South Korea approached the IMF for 
assistance and secured a $58 billion bailout package in December 1997. 
The IMF rescue package, of course, came along with preconditions for economic reform and 
restructuring, which included: 
 Macroeconomic adjustment, which incorporated monetary and fiscal tightening. 
 Structural reform, which included corporate and financial restructuring, in addition to 
trade, capital market and foreign exchange liberalization.  
But the austere fiscal and monetary policies had an adverse impact on the economy. Investor and 
consumer confidence tumbled, while the unemployment rate soared. Subsequently, the IMF 
reversed its stance and permitted an expansion of the fiscal deficit to prevent the economy from 
contracting severely. Interest rates were also gradually allowed to decline. Despite these 
measures, the South Korean economy witnessed a massive contraction of 7% in 1998. Yet, 
proactive economic reforms, focused on chaebol restructuring by President Kim Dae Jung, 
helped the economy bounce back the very next year. In 1999, the South Korean economy 
expanded 9%, and in 2000, it grew 8%. 
 
Chaebols at the helm of corporate sector reform  
Corporate restructuring consisted of the following measures to be implemented: 
 Drastic reduction of corporate debt 
 Improvement in transparency 
 End of cross-debt guarantees by conglomerates 
 Chaebols to concentrate on core businesses 
 Greater managerial accountability to shareholders 
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As a positive impact of the corporate reform, the debt-equity ratio of the top 30 chaebols reduced 
from 500% in 1997 to 118% in 2005 (‘The Post-Crisis Changes in the Financial System in Korea: Problems 
of Neoliberal Restructuring and Financial Opening after 1997’, Kang-Kook Lee, TWN Global Economy Series, 
2010). Many chaebols were also encouraged to trim off their several non-related business 
diversifications. This would help them focus on their core businesses, and thereby increase 
efficiencies as well as global competitiveness. Yet, while the debt ratio decreased rapidly, the 
chaebols’ profits did not recover as quickly.  This was because their newfound cautious 
management approach, as well as the financial restructuring, had led to lower corporate 
investment. 
 
The South Korean government resorted to a combination of approaches to come to the aid of the 
distressed chaebols, such as court-supervised insolvencies, out-of-court settlements, and the 
tapping of foreign capital. And then there were the “Big Deals”, which involved mergers and 
acquisitions, and the restructuring of the subsidiaries of the top five chaebols. In October 1998, 
these top five chaebols announced that they would undergo restructuring in their seven business 
divisions of semiconductors, petrochemicals, oil refining, aviation, railway rolling stock, power 
generation and ship engines (‘A Turnaround in South Korea’, Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Frontline, Volume 16, 
1999).  
 
Some prominent mergers driven by the “Big Deal” were: 
 The acquisition of LG Semiconductors by Hyundai Electronics, which was later renamed 
Hynix Semiconductor. 
 The purchase of Hanwha Energy’s refining unit by Hyundai Oil Refinery. 
 The acquisition of a 51% stake in Kia Motors by Hyundai Motors following Kia’s 
bankruptcy. Currently, Hyundai Motors holds less than 40% stake. 
 The purchase of a 70% stake in Samsung Motors by Renault. Today, Renault’s stake 
stands at about 80%. 
While corporate restructuring was effective to some extent in driving reforms in the chaebols, 
corporate governance reform remained limited. Insider control stemming from family 
strangleholds in chaebol firms continues to prevail. 
 
 
Financial sector restructuring supports a rapid economic recovery 
The comprehensive financial sector reforms involved the following measures: 
 Closure of weak financial institutions. 
 Cleansing financial institutions of non-performing loans. 
 Recapitalization of viable financial institutions. 
 Enforcement of stricter prudential regulation. 
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With these reforms, unviable financial institutions, many of which had come into existence in the 
early 1990s, were closed down. As a result, 550 financial institutions out of 2072 had gone out of 
business by 2001, and by 2008, 44% of all financial institutions had disappeared. Another 
significant positive development was the decline in non-performing loans, which fell from 13.6% 
of total commercial bank loans in 1999 to 3.3% in 2001 (‘The Post-Crisis Changes in the Financial 
System in Korea: Problems of Neoliberal Restructuring and Financial Opening after 1997’, Kang-Kook Lee, TWN 
Global Economy Series, 2010). 
 
The government also ushered in extensive and systematic capital account liberalization, 
completely opening up the domestic capital markets and short-term money markets to foreign 
investors, while completely abolishing the foreign ownership ceiling for South Korean 
companies by May 1998. The number of business categories open for foreign ownership was 
increased, while the rules for foreign borrowing of domestic firms as well as their international 
issuance of bonds were liberalized. The government also liberalized individuals’ purchases of 
foreign currency and payments as well as residents’ deposits in foreign financial institutions, 
while also freeing up non-residents’ bond issuance as well as borrowings. 
 
A snapshot of prominent chaebol companies  
 
Company Market Capitalization      ($ Millions) Stock Exchange Listing 
Hyundai Motor 29,557 Korea Stock Exchange 
Hyundai Mobis 21,940 Korea Stock Exchange 
Hyundai Heavy Industries 21,829 Korea Stock Exchange 
LG Electronics 12,191 Korea Stock Exchange 
LG Chemicals 19,383 Korea Stock Exchange 
Samsung Electronics 100,374 Korea Stock Exchange 
Samsung Life Insurance 18,242 Korea Stock Exchange 
S K Energy 11,799 Korea Stock Exchange 
S K Telecom 12,145 Korea Stock Exchange 
 
  
HYUNDAI GROUP 
 
Hyundai Togun, the first company of the group, was established by founder Chung Ju-Yung in 
1947. It was renamed Hyundai Construction in 1950 (now Hyundai Engineering and 
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Construction) and was extensively involved in post-war reconstruction in South Korea. Togun 
became South Korea’s first construction company to win an overseas project in 1965. 
Successively diversifying into other fields, the firm established Hyundai Motors in 1967, as well 
as Hyundai Heavy Industries, which was engaged in shipyard construction. The company 
founded its global logistics arm Hyundai Merchant Marine in 1976. In 1983, Hyundai 
Electronics was established to support auto, ship and marine manufacturing. A decade later a 
semiconductor company was established as an outgrowth of Hyundai Electronics, and in 1999, 
this firm merged with LG Semiconductor Co. In 2001 the company was renamed Hynix 
Semiconductor. Some of the other companies established in the 1980s: Hyundai Elevator, 
Hyundai Research Institute, and Hyundai Logistics catering to the domestic logistics industry. 
 
Hyundai invests about 10% of its total revenue in research and development, resulting in 
technological innovation and product enhancement. In addition to improvements in the 
automobile engine, some of the company’s key breakthrough innovations are in the areas of the 
hydrogen and alcohol fueled cars, electric vehicles, magnetic levitation trains, LNG ships, and 
passenger helicopters. 
 
After the Asian 1997 financial and economic crisis, the Hyundai Group spun-off many of its 
businesses including Hyundai Automotive Group, Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hyundai 
Department Stores. Hyundai Construction merged with Hyundai Engineering to form Hyundai 
Engineering & Construction in 1999, while Hyundai Electronics acquired LG Semiconductors in 
the same year and was renamed Hynix Semiconductor. Following the bankruptcy of Kia Motors 
in 1998, Hyundai also acquired a substantial stake in the beleaguered company. The existing 
affiliated companies of the Hyundai Group include: Hyundai Merchant Marine, Hyundai 
Securities, Hyundai Elevator, Hyundai Logiem, Hyundai Asan, Hyundai U & I, Hyundai 
Research Institute and Hyundai Investment Network. 
 
SAMSUNG GROUP 
The Samsung Group was founded in 1938 by Byung Chull Lee and was primarily engaged in the 
export of fish, vegetables and fruits to China. In 1951, Samsung Moolsan (Samsung Corporation 
today) was established, and three years later the textile company Cheil Industries, which is now 
no longer affiliated to Samsung, was founded. The group acquired Ankuk Fire & Marine 
Insurance in 1958 and Dongbang Life Insurance in 1963, renaming them as Samsung Fire & 
Marine Insurance and Samsung Life Insurance later. Samsung Electronics as well as Samsung-
Sanyo Electronics were established in 1969, the latter merging with Samsung Electronics in 
1977. Diversifying into heavy, chemical and petrochemical industries as well as into 
shipbuilding in the 1970s, Samsung established Heavy Industries, Samsung Petrochemical and 
Samsung Shipbuilding (merged with Samsung Heavy Industries in 1983). 
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Samsung developed a flourishing home electronics business, and apart from being a major 
domestic manufacturer, had a burgeoning export business as well. Another major move for the 
group was its acquisition of a 50% stake in Korea Semiconductor in 1974, making Samsung 
Electronics a leader in semiconductor manufacturing. With the founding of Samsung Precision 
(now Samsung Techwin) in 1977, the company also ventured into the hi-tech aerospace sector. 
The decade of the 1980s was significant as Samsung’s core technology businesses witnessed 
unprecedented global growth. Samsung Data Systems (now Samsung SDS) was established in 
1985, marking its entry in IT services, including systems integration and management, 
consulting, and networking. The merger of Samsung Electronics and Samsung Semiconductor & 
Telecommunications in 1988 was a strategic move to establish the company as a global leader in 
the electronics segment. 
The early 1990s was marked by a substantial increase in competition for hi-tech businesses, with 
widespread mergers, buy-outs and restructuring. As a result, 14 Samsung affiliated companies 
became independent and the group also made some significant acquisitions. In the mid-1990s 
Samsung cemented its position as a manufacturer of world-class products, with 17 different 
offerings including semiconductors, computer monitors, LCD screens, and color picture tubes, 
all ranking in the top 5 according to global market share.  
Having gone through a successful phase of restructuring already in the early 1990s, the Samsung 
Group weathered the 1997 Asian financial crisis better than most of its Korean counterparts. In 
order to maintain its competitiveness, the company sold 10 business units to overseas companies 
for $1.5 billion. Samsung Motors (established in 1994), which started selling cars in 1998 at the 
peak of the financial crisis, sold a 70% of its stake to Renault in 2000. Samsung Heavy 
Industries’ construction equipment business was sold to Volvo, and its forklift business was sold 
to Clark. The company however continued its dominance in digital technologies and the 
electronics sectors. The group has 34 existing affiliated companies including Samsung Electro-
Mechanics, Samsung SDI, Samsung Corning Precision Glass, Samsung SDS, Samsung Mobile 
Display, Samsung Techwin, Samsung Heavy Industries, Samsung Life Insurance, Samsung 
Securities, and Samsung Petrochemicals. 
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Chaebol companies today: Impact of the global financial crisis 
While the export-driven South Korean economy suffered under the aftermath of the global 
economic crisis of 2008, the government’s immediate and pro-active response, including a 
stimulus package and budgetary support helped the economy skirt the recession. While the rest 
of the developed world struggled to cope with a recession, South Korea grew 2.2% in 2008, 
followed by 0.2% in 2009. Now with global economic recovery underway, the economy has 
reverted to buoyancy and is expected to expand 5.9% in 2010 according to the Bank of Korea. 
Compared to a 13.2% decline in 2009, exports from South Korea are expected to recover 
strongly, increasing 26.4% this year. 
Significantly, while South Korean exports suffered during the global crisis, the country’s biggest 
companies, Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motors, still managed to grab market share from 
competitors in Japan, Europe and the U.S. They benefited from the depreciation of the Korean 
currency, the won, while successfully marketing their products like electronics and semi-
conductors to the still growing emerging markets to make up for the loss of sales to the West 
(‘The Chaebol Conundrum’, The Economist, March 31, 2010). Standing in testimony to this success, 
Samsung Electronics was the 39th most profitable company among the Fortune 500 global list for 
2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings Growth 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Hyundai Motor 10.25% -13.94% 104.54% 142.76%(H1) 
Hyundai Mobis 13.09% 40.34% 48.18% 69.47% (H1) 
Hyundai Heavy Industries 126.74% 31.85% -4.88% 131.67% (Q2) 
LG Electronics 411.29% -60.47% 324.43% -33% (Q2) 
Samsung Electronics -6.2% -25.53% 74.62% 83% (Q2) 
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Resilient and raring to go 
Remarkably, the South Korean 
chaebols, despite enduring a body 
blow during the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, managed to adapt to the 
changing business environment and 
reinvent themselves. In addition to 
adopting prudent financial practices 
as well as corporate governance 
reforms, they continued to innovate 
and launch new products 
successfully, maintaining their global 
competitiveness. The test of their 
resilience was their ability to sail 
through the global economic crisis of 
2008, while many other global 
multinationals were shaken. While 
these giant conglomerates remain heavily dependent on exports, they have ensured that their 
exports are well-diversified globally, a strategy that countered the global plunge in trade much 
better than the other economies (‘Return of the Overlord’, The Economist, March 31, 2010). Once 
perceived to be too unwieldy for the contemporary business world, the chaebols have sprung 
back, proving that they are global corporations to be reckoned with, as well as the champions of 
the South Korean economy.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chaebol Companies in Fortune Global Rankings (2010) 
 
Company Global 500 Rank Revenues ($ million) 
Samsung 
Electronics 
32 108,927 
LG 67 78,892 
Hyundai Motor 78 71,678 
S K Holdings 104 64,396 
Samsung Life 
Insurance 
316 25,805 
Hanwha 358 23,521 
Hyundai Heavy 
Industries 
375 22,926 
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